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Abstract
The proposal that young children's communicative intentions stem
from prelinguistic cognitive abilities is examined in detail. The most
developed available formulation of this proposal, that provided by Brown
(1973), is evaluated and the evidence in support of it is found to be
insufficient. Three crucial problems that must be solved before an
acceptable version of the proposal can be formulated are raised. These
are: (1) determining prelinguistic cognitive abilities; (2) individuating
children's communicative intentions; and (3) finding criteria for deter-
mining whether a communicative intention stems from prelinguistic cogni-
tive abilities. Approaches to solving these problems are suggested.
2The study of child language has undergone a major change in the last
five years. The focus has shifted from the form of children's speech to
its functions - from syntax to what children are trying to communicate
when they speak. The major contributors to this transition include Bloom
(1970), Bowerman (1973), Schlesinger (1971) and Slobin (1973). The trans-
ition itself is best documented by Brown (1973).
A major aim of this recent work has been to delimit the set of entities
and relations about which children intend to communicate. Several proposed
lists of children's communicative intentions are available, two of which
are shown in Table 1 with examples of children's utterances. The first list
is from Slobin (1971), who uses the phrase "expressive functions" to refer
to this aspect of child language. The second is from Schlesinger (1971).
In his model, underlying communicative intentions are mapped onto language
via a set of realizational rules. Other such lists can be found in Bloom,
Lightbown g Hood (1975), Edwards (1974) and Brown (1973).
Insert Table 1 about here
All of these researchers focus on the period of language acquisition
when the child has just begun to produce many two-word utterances. This
period, labelled Stage I by Brown, usually begins at about 18 months of
age. The discussion here will be limited to Stage I speech.1
The communicative intention underlying a child's utterance is determined
by the method of rich interpretation (Brown, 1973). This method consists
of inferring the child's intended meaning on the basis of the words he says
and their order, combined with the situational and linguistic context. The
possibility of systematic biases is adult's interpretations of children's
utterances cannot be completely eliminated. However, for the purposes of
this paper, the assumption that the method of rich interpretation reliably
yields a good approximation to the child's intended meaning will be accepted.
The focus of this paper is the following proposal: Stage I children's
communicative intentions stem from prelinguistic cognitive abilities. This
proposal has gained general acceptance among researchers of child language.
For example, Bloom et al. begin their recent monograph by stating:
Research in child language to date has resulted in a consensus
about the semantics of early two- and three-word speech. [This
consensus] is that the semantics of early sentences have to do
with ideas about objects that originate in the development of
sensorimotor intelligence (1975, p. 1).
In this paper, I will argue that the acceptance of this proposal is premature.
The discussion will be divided into three major sections. The first contains
a description of the best available formulation of the proposal, that pro-
vided by Brown (1973)4 The second presents a detailed evaluation of Brown's
analysis. The third section contains a discussion of some crucial, often
ignored, problems which must be solved before an acceptable version of this
proposal can be formulated. Some suggestions as to how these problems might
be approached are also presented.
I. Brown's Formulation of the Proposal
Roger Brown (1973) presents the most developed available formulation
of the proposal that children's communicative intentions stem from prelin-
guistic cognitive development. His analysis will be summarized in three
parts. The first discusses the specific list of Stage I communicative
intentions he presents. The second is concerned with the prelinguistic
child's cognitive abilities. Brown refers to Piaget's (1952, 1954, 1962)
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nomination with this, that, see, there and here, recurrence with more and
another, and nonexistence with all-gone, no-more and no. These operations
have a wide range of application and each occurs very often in Stage 1
speech. The semantic relations are agent-action, action-object, agent-
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object, action-location, entity-location and possessor-possession. These
ten major meanings account for the majority of utterances found in Brown's
samples of Stage I speech. Also, each meaning appears in just about every
sample. Therefore the evidence for their universality is fairly strong.
Some Stage I utterances express meanings not listed as major meanings
because they have a low frequency of occurrence or do not appear at all in
some of the samples. Brown lists seven such meanings and notes that they
might have been included among the major meanings had there been larger
samples of children's speech. These peripheral meanings are instrumental,
benefactive, indirect object dative, experiencer, comitative, conjunction
and classifactory. Including these among the major meanings would raise
the percentage of utterances accounted for but would lower the appearance
of universality.
Prelinguistic Cognitive Abilities
In order to evaluate Brown's proposal, it is necessary to specify the
set of prelinguistic cognitive abilities that might form the basis for com-
municative intentions. Since Piaget provides the most detailed and compre-
hensive available description of infants' cognitive development, it is to
his work that Brown refers:
A rather short list of propositions and relations (between 8 and 15)
will encompass the nonlexical or compositional meanings of the
majority of all multimorphemic utterances produced by the Stage I
children...and these meanings seem to represent linguistically the
6sensorimotor intelligence which develops, according to Piaget's
research, in the 18 months or so which normally precede Stage I
(1973, p. 64).
Piaget's view of sensorimotor intelligence is based on his observations
of young children's actions, primarily those of his own three children from
bitth to 18 months of age. The main description of the sensorimotor child
are found in three of Piaget's books (1952, 1954, 1962), all originally
published at least 30 years ago. Brown's list of communicative intentions
stems from a data base consisting of spontaneous utterances of 32 children,
ages 19 months to 2 ½ years, learning 12 different languages. We therefore
have two independent descriptions of the young child, one of prelinguistic
cognitive development and the other of language acquisition. These descrip-
tions were done many years apart by scholars with different aims, theoretical
orientations and methods. If these two descriptions fit together as well as
Brown suggests -- if they both attribute to the child the same knowledge of
the world around him -- we would have an important convergence of independent
evidence. Therefore Brown's proposal warrants careful evaluation.
Since Piaget's description of the sensorimotor child is an integral
part of Brown's proposal, a brief overview of it will be presented. Those
aspects of sensorimotor development directly relevant to particular communi-
cative intentions will be covered in more detail in the next section, when
the communicative intentions are discussed individually.
Piaget divides cognitive development into four major periods: sensori-
motor, preoperational, concrete operational and formal operational. Only
the sensorimotor period, which begins at birth and ends at about 18 months,
need be considered here.
According to Piaget, the infant's mental life begins with an undif-
ferentiated world. The new-born infant does not conceive of himself and
objects in the environment as independent entities: a given object or
person exists for the infant only when it is involved in his actions or
perceptions. Since during the first months of life everything is embodied
in the activity of the child, "the universe presents neither permanent
objects, nor objective space, nor time interconnecting events as such,
nor causality external to the personal actions" (Piaget, 1954, pp. xiii-
xiv). During the sensorimotor period, there is a "transition from chaos
to cosmos" (Piaget, 1954, p. xiii). By the end of this period the child
has developed concepts of objects, space, causality and time that are well
on their way towards becoming the adult concepts.
Development is characterized by Piaget as the "continuous creation
of increasingly complex forms and a progressive balancing of these forms
with the environment" (1952, p. 3). By "forms" Piaget means some sort
of cognitive structures or internal representations of the world. He
usually refers to such constructs as schemata. The child's schemata are
balanced with the environment when they enable him to function successfully
in his surroundings -- to attain goals, predict the results of actions,
and so on. Since the concept of a schema is central to Piaget's theory,
it will be described before going on to the processes and stages of devel-
opment.
A schema is a cognitive structure underlying a sequence of physical
or mental actions that form an organized whole. For example, there is a
schema of grasping, since grasping consists of a series of actions such as
reaching, touching, finger closing, and arm retraction. The defining
characteristic of the sensorimotor stage is that all the schemata involve
only physical actions (perceiving is considered to be a physical action
by Piaget). Once the child has begun to use symbols and develops mental
actions, he has progressed beyond the sensorimotor period.
In order to be a schema, the sequence of actions must be repeatable
and recognizable. Flavell writes:
[An action schema] must have a certain cohesiveness and must maintain
its identity as a quasi-stable, repeatable unit. It must possess
component actions which are tightly interconnected and governed by a
core meaning...it is a schema precisely by virtue of the fact that
the behavior components which it sets in motion form a strong whole,
a recurrent and identifiable figure against a background of less
tightly organized behaviors (1963, p. 54).
Flavell also points out that schemata actually refer to classes of total
acts which, although distinct from each other, share common features:
A schema is a kind of concept, category or underlying strategy which
subsumes a whole collection of distinct but similar action sequences.
For example, it is clear that no two grasping sequences are ever going
to be exactly alike; a grasping schema -- a 'concept' of grasping --
is nonetheless said to be operative when any such sequence is seen to
emerge (1963, p. 54).
The processes that account for development throughout all periods are
adaptation and organization. Adaptation refers to changes in the child's
schemata resulting from interactions with his surroundings. These adapta-
tions enable the child to better predict and cope with his environment.
Organization refers tot'the tendency to combine schemata into higher-order,
integrated systems. Piaget describes organization and adaptation as follows:
They are two complementary processes of a single mechanism, the first
[organization] being the internal aspect of the cycle of which adapta-
tion constitutes the external aspect...The 'accord of thoughts with
things' and the 'accord of thought with itself' express this dual
functional invariant of adaptation and organization (1952, pp. 7-8).
Adaptation is divided into two interrelated processes, assimilation
and accommodation. Assimilation is the incorporation of new objects and
experiences into existing schemata. For example, the infant may assimilate
all small reachable objects to his grasping schema. Accommodation is the
modification of existing schemata as a result of new experiences. For
example, the infant may accommodate his grasping schema to larger objects
by modifying his actions to use both hands in coordination.
Piaget (1952) discusses in detail six stages of sensorimotor develop-
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ment. The main characteristics of each stage will be mentioned here.
As already noted, the new-born's world is undifferentiated; objects
and people exist only as part of the child's activity. It is in this
sense that the infant can be called egocentric. The Stage 1 infant shows
little behavior other than a few uncoordinated, reflexlike activities --
sucking, swallowing, crying, etc. The first signs of accommodation and
assimilation can be found in changes in the infant's sucking behavior
during this stage.
The Stage 2 infant is still profoundly egocentric, much more interested
in the act of applying schemata than in exploring and comprehending his
environment. At this stage, the child's schemata begin to undergo definite
alterations as a function of experience. During this stage the first of
the circular reactions appear. A circular reaction is a series of repeti-
tions of a sensorimotor behavior. The Stage 2 primary circular reactions
are centered on the infant's own body, rather than being directed towards
manipulating surrounding objects as the later circular reactions are. A
primary circular reaction occurs when an infant happens upon a new experience
as a consequent of some act and then tries to recapture the experience by
repeating the original movement. For example, the infant may repeatedly
direct his thumb to his mouth after having fortuitiously done so at first.
The Stage 3 infant has three new important behavior patterns. One
is the secondary circular reaction, which consists of attempts to main-
tain, through repetition, an interesting change in the environment produced
by the child's own action. For example, the child may shake a rattle, be
interested by the resulting unexpected sound, and therefore continue to
shake it. According to Piaget, the secondary circular readtion is the
first sensorimotor analogue to classes. For example, the rattle is seen
as an instance of things "to shake and hear noise'!. It is also an analogue
to relations. For example, the child realizes a relationship between how
hard he shakes and how much noise is produced.
The second behavior pattern that appears in Stage 3 is motor recog-
nition. The child, confronted by objects which habitually set his secondary
circular reactions in motion, limits himself to outlining his customary
movements instead of actually performing them. According to Piaget, it
is as if the child could not recognize the object without working his
schema to some extent.
The third new behavior pattern of Stage 3 consists of the infant
attempting to cause from a distant the repetition of interesting spectacles
that he did not originally cause. Piaget calls these behaviors "procedures
for making interesting spectacles last."
The most important developments during Stage 4 are the coordination
of schemata and their application to new situations. Schemata begin to
become intercoordinated to form new totalities. The schemata become more
mobile and flexible: The infant tries various schemata on unfamiliar
objects in order to explore their properties and uses a variety of means
to pursue a goal that is not immediately obtainable. This last behavior
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is the first evidence of a separation of means and ends for the sensori-
motor child. The Stage 4 child also begins to anticipate events that are
independent of his own actions.
In Stage 5, the tertiary circular reactions appear. These consist of
repetitions of actions with intentional modification in order to explore
what will happen. Piaget describes one of Laurent's "experiments in order
to see:"
He grasps in succession a celluloid swan, a box, etc., stretches out
his arm and lets them fall. He distinctly varies the positions of
the fall. Sometimes he stretches out his arm vertically, sometimes
he holds it obliquely, in front of or behind his eyes, etc. When
an object falls in a new position...he lets it fall two or three
times more on the same place, as though to study the spatial rela-
tion; then he modifies the situation. (1962, p. 269).
The Stage 5 child is able to discover new means through active experi-
mentation and can thereby solve problems which demand new and unfamiliar
procedures. For example, it is by experimentation during this stage that
the child becomes able to manipulate objects of various shapes through the
bars of his crib. It is also during this stage that the use of objects
as instruments first appears: The child learns to use a stick and other
objects to extend his reach and draw objects toward him.
Stage 6 is characterized by the invention of new means through mental
combination. The child begins to use symbols and has reached the end of
sensorimotor development.
Piaget (1954) traces the six stages of development with regard to
the concepts of objects, space, causality and time. Since these concepts
are reflected in children's communicative intentions their development will
be briefly described.
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The object concept is built upon an initial state where there are
undifferentiated action-object experiences rather than a concept of
objects. In the early stages, the child will not search for a hidden
object: The object does not exist for him when outside of his perceptual
field. By the end of the sensorimotor period, objects are known to be
permanent, substantial, firm in existence even when not directly affecting
perception. The child will now search for vanished objects and is able
to follow a sequence of invisible displacements (e.g., an object being
moved from place to place while hidden by the mover's hand). The child
also realizes that he himself and other people are objects existing in
space.
According to Piaget, the new-born infant's concept of space consists
of a collection of unrelated spaces organized around the major sensori-
motor spheres of activity: a visual space, an auditory space, etc. In
the early sensorimotor stages there is a practical concept of space which
depends upon the infant's perceptions and actions. At this stage there is
no distinction for the infant between an object changing its location and
changing its state. That is, there is no distinction between moving out-
side the perceptual field and dissappearing, or between finding and creating.
At the end of the sensorimotor period the child conceives of a single objec-
tive space in which all objects, including himself and others, are contained
and interrelated.
Piaget distinguishes two types of causality. One type appears in the
early sensorimotor stages as efficacy, which refers to the infant's sense
that feelings of effort and longing are responsible for external happenings.
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The second type appears in the early sensorimotor stages as phenomenalism,
which refers to the infant's feelings that temporal contiguity between two
events means that one caused the other, without regard to spatial contiguity.
By the end of the sensorimotor period efficacy has developed into psycholog-
ical causality, the sense of causing one's own actions through volition
and of willing to perform an action before doing so. Phenomenalism develops
into physical causality: The child comes to realize that both spatial and
temporal contiguity are generally necessary for one object to act upon
another. The child also apprehends that himself and others can be both
causers and recipients of actions.
Time develops from the infants vague feelings of duration imminent in
his actions to the notion of time as a generalized medium, like space, in
which the self and others can be located. The child at the end of the sen-
sorimotor period is capable of recalling a temporally ordered set of events,
even if his own actions were not involved. However, the concept of time is
far from fully developed.
Deterniming Whether a Communicative Intention Stems from a Prelinguistic
Cognitive Ability
The final element necessary to evaluate Brown's proposal is a way of
deterniming whether or not a communicative intention stems from prelinguistic
cognitive development. Unfortunately, the meaning of "stems" is very vague
and Brown does not provide any well-defined criterion for determining
whether a given communicative intention is related to a given cognitive
ability. What Brown does provide is a set of examples of prelinguistic
cognitive abilities and related communicative intentions. In most of his
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examples he determines some of the "intellectual prerequisites" of a
Stage I meaning and then finds evidence in Piaget's writings that these
are included in the child's cognitive capabilities by the end of the
sensorimotor period. These prerequisites are things the child must know
about the world in order to use a linguistic construction with the meaning
attributed to it by the method of rich interpretation. The following is
a complete list of Brown's (1973, pp. 198-201) examples of intellectual
prerequisites acquired during the sensorimotor period:
(1) The ability to recognize objects and actions, which is a prerequi-
site for both nomination and recurrence constructions.
(2) The ability to anticipate objects and actions from naturally
occurring signs and to notice when such anticipations are not confirmed.
This is a prerequisite for nonexistence constructions.
(3) Knowledge of the world of enduring objects and a single spatial
field. This is a prerequisite for linguistic constructions involving loca-
tion.
(4) The ability to distinguish actions from the objects of actions,
and the self from other persons and objects. This is a prerequisite for
linguistic constructions involving agents, actions, or objects of actions.
(5) Knowledge of the self and others as potential sources of causality
and as recipients of forces. This is a prerequisite for linguistic construc-
tions involving agents, objects of actions, indirect object datives, or
experiencers.
Brown also gives two examples of "primitive forms" of meanings. These
are sensorimotor action patterns which serve functions similar to later
15
linguistic constructions. Motor recognition, the performing of an abbre-
viated form of the usual schema in response to an object, is said to be
a primitive form of nomination, since both express recognition. The
Stage 3 child's procedures for making interesting spectacles last are
regarded as primitive forms of recurrence expressions used as requests.
Brown's procedure for determining whether a communicative intention
stems from sensorimotor development seems to require only that there be
some general similarity between the cognitive abilities necessary to use
the communicative intention and some aspect of sensorimotor intelligence,
or between the functions of the communicative intention and a sensorimotor
schema. Therefore, in the following evaluation of Brown's proposal, an
aspect of sensorimotor intelligence will be considered a precursor to a
communication intention if they require similar cognitive abilities of
if the functions they serve for the child are similar.
II. An Evaluation of Brown's Proposal
In the analysis presented in this section, the ten major meanings
(divided into the three operations and the seven relations), the seven
peripheral meanings, and two other possible meanings will be discussed.
As already noted, a criterion of similarity that approximates Brown's as
well as possible will be used to determine whether Piaget's account of
sensorimotor development contains a prelinguistic basis for each meaning.
Operations of Reference
Nomination. The operation of nomination is said to occur when "the
presence of the referent [is] made manifest by some action calling attention
16
to it for members of the communication group" (Brown, 1973, p. 189).
Stage I children's nomination utterances consist of an introducer, such
as this, that or see, and the name of the referent. The referent can be
an object, action, or attribute. However, since most Stage I nomination
utterances name objects, only the sensorimotor patterns relevant to the
recognition of objects will be discussed here. The recognition of actions
will be covered under the agent-action relation; the recognition of attri-
butes under the entity-attribute relation.
Brown views motor recognition as a primitive form of nomination.
Motor recognition is the performing of an abbreviated form of the usual
schema in response to a familiar object:
What happens, in effect, is that the child, confronted by objects
or sights which habitually set in motion his secondary circular
reactions, limits himself to outlining the customary movements
instead of actually performing them. Everything takes place as
though the child were satisfied to recognize these objects or sights
and to make a note of this recognition, but could not recognize them
except by working, rather than thinking, the schema of recognition...
Thus when seeing a doll which she has actually swung many times,
Lucienne limits herself to opening and closing her hands or shaking
her legs, but very briefly and without real effort (Piaget, 1952,
pp. 185-187).
It is not necessary that the schema be in reduced form to be evidence
of recognition. Each time the child applies a schema to an object he recog-
nizes or classifies it:
The child, in assimilating to these schemata the objects which
appear in his field or vision, "recognizes" them through this
very act (Piaget, 1952, p. 71).
The secondary schemata constitute the first outline of classes --
perceiving an object as something to shake, to rub, etc. This is,
in effect, the functional equivalent of the operation of classifi-
cation peculiar to conceptual thought (Piaget, 1952, p. 183).
17
Piaget's theory attributes to the sensorimotor child the ability to
recognize objects and to form concepts of sets of similar objects. These
abilities are prerequisite to nomination and therefore there is some sort
of sensorimotor basis for nomination constructions. However, in order to
demonstrate a strong relationship between nomination and sensorimotor
schemata it woild .be necessary to 'show that the specific coteepts reflected
in the child's utterances stem from specific sensorimotor schemata. For
example, the child gradually distinguishes a set of objects to which his
schema of rolling can successfully apply. If it is this set of objects to
which the child latter applies a verbal label, such as ball, then there is
a clear sensorimotor precursor to nomination constructions involving this
label. Unfortunately, Piaget does not provide any usable criterion for
determining what does and what does not constitute a schema. Therefore,
it is impossible to determine which of the child's concepts are based on
sensorimotor schemata and a strong case that nomination utterances reflect
sensorimotor intelligence cannot be supported.
Recurrence. The operation of recurrence is used to comment upon or
request the reappearence of an object, person or process. According to
Brown, Stage I recurrence utterances refer to or request one of three things:
the reappearance of a referent previously present (e.g., More Mommy); the
appearance of another instance of a category of which one instance has
already been present (e.g., More cookie); or an additional quantity of some
mass, some of which has already been present (e.g., More milk).
By combining comments on recurrence with requests for recurrence,
Brown has put together two types of utterances that are very different in
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terms of their sensorimotor precursors. Recurrence comments and recur-
rence requests will be discussed separately here.
Recurrence comments are similar to nomination constructions in that
the child names either a particular referent or a referent as an instance
of a category. The relationship of this ability to sensorimotor schemata
has already been discussed. Recurrence comments differ from nomination
in that the child is also remarking on the previous presence of the referent
(or another instance of the same category). This requires, for one thing,
some memory capacity. There are many sensorimotor phenomena which show
that the child has the memory capacity required. For example, the Stage
6 child can imitate a model that is no longer present: His imitation must
be based on his memory of the model. The child also demonstrates his
memory capacity when he follows a series of invisible displacements. In
one observation, Piaget places a coin in his hand and then moves his closed
hand under three different objects in sequence. The child searches under
each object in turn until she finds the coin (1954, p. 79). Clearly, the
child remembered the coin being in the hand and the path the hand followed.
Another prerequisite to recurrence comments is a notion of the imme-
diate past: The presence of a dog might result in the child's saying
another doggie if he had seen one a few minutes before, but this would be
unlikely if he had not seen another dog for a long time. The notion of
the immediate past is, of course, closely tied to the memory of recent
events and their localization in time. Piaget provides numerous examples
of deferred reactions where the child either looks at or acts upon an
object, is momentarily distracted, and then returns to his looking or
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acting. For example:
5
At 0;8(7) Lauret sees his mother enter the room and watches her
until she seats herself behind him. Then he resumes playing but
turns around several times in succession to look at her again.
However there is no sound or noise to remind him of her presence
(Piaget, 1954, p. 332).
Piaget writes of this observation:
When Lauret watches his mother sit down behind him, then returns
to the objects which I present to him and then turns around several
times, it is apparent that he is capable not only of recognizing
her (recognitory memory) but also of locating her in memory at
the place she has just occupied in a recent past, in contradistincT
tion to other places where she was seen previously (localization
in time),..Such a behavior pattern presupposes an elementary
concept of before and after (1954, pp. 332-333).
Piaget therefore attributes to the sensorimotor child both the memory
capacity and the temporal concept that are prerequisite to recurrence
comments.
The situation is more complicated for recurrence used as a request.
Brown regards the sensorimotor child's procedures for making interesting
spectacles last as a primitive form of recurrence requests. The sensori-
motor behaviors of secondary circular reactions, using another's hand as
an intermediary to get an action performed, and searching for hidden
objects also bear some resemblance to recurrence requests. The similar-
ities and differences of each of these behaviors and recurrence requests
will be examined.
The secondary circular reactions will be considered first since,
according to Piaget, they form the basis for the procedures for making
interesting spectacles last. There are several defining characteristics
of secondary circular reactions: (1) They are attempts to maintain,
through repetition of an action, an interesting change in the environment;
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(2) The interesting change was originally produced unintentionally by
an action of the child; (3) Although the original action was uninten-
tional, the repetitions of it are intentional; (4) Unlike the tertiary
circular reactions, there is no systematic variation of the action in
order to explore the change in results. An example of a secondary circular
reaction follows:
Laurent, from 0;4(19) knows how to strike hanging objects inten-
tionally with his hand. At 0;4(22) he holds a stick; he does not
know what to do with it and slowly passes it from hand to hand.
The stick then happens to strike a toy hanging from the bassinet
hood. Laurent, immediately interested in this unexpected result,
keeps the stick raised in the same position and brings it notice-
ably nearer to the toy. He strikes it a second time. Then he
draws the stick back but moving it as little as possible as though
trying to conserve the favorable position, then he brings it nearer
to the toy, and so on, more and more rapidly (1952, p. 176).
Secondary circular reactions are similar to recurrence in that the
child is trying to get something to recur. However, they differ in
several ways. In secondary circular reactions, the child repeats his
original action in order to get an event that he caused to recur. When
using a verbal request, the child is trying to get someone other than
himself to be the agent of the recurrence. Also, the use of a recur-
rence utterance does not require that the child caused the event he wants
repeated.
Brown does not distinguish between the reappearance of an object
and the recurrence of an event (i.e., objects undergoing actions).
However, this distinction is important when examining the relationship
between sensorimotor behaviors and recurrence requests. Both types of
requests appear in Stage I speech, but requests for the reappearance of
objects are much more frequent. Secondary circular reactions always
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involve the repetition of events. Furthermore, in all of Piaget's
examples (1952, pp. 157-185), the objects of interest remained in the
child's perceptual field from the time of the original activity until the
repetition of it. Recurrence requests therefore differ from secondary
circular reactions in that they often express a desire for the reappearance
of a removed object, while secondary circular reactions always are attempts
to get an interesting activity of a still present object to recur.
The procedures for making interesting spectacles last are derived
from the secondary circular reactions but differ from them in several ways.
These differences make the procedures more similar than secondary circular
reactions to recurrence requests. For example, the procedures for making
interesting spectacles last apply to events that the child did not origi-
nally cause. Like verbal requests, these procedures are attempts to
cause recurrence at a distance and the objects involved do not necessarily
remain in the child's perceptual field between the original event and the
repetition.
The prodecures for making interesting spectacles last differ from
verbal recurrence requests in at least two ways. Although in these proce-
dures the child attempts to act upon an object from a distance, he is not
trying to use an intermediary to cause the event to recur. According to
Piaget, at the stage of development in which these procedures appear the
child still conceives of his actions as having the potential to cause
recurrence from a distance. The second difference is that, like the
secondary circular reactions, the procedures for making interesting
spectacles last involve the recurrence of events, not the reappearance
of objects. Therefore, these procedures, at best, provide a sensorimotor
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precursor only for the small subset of Stage I recurrence requests that
involve events.
Another sensorimotor behavior possibly related to recurrence is
the use of someone else's hand as an intermediary:
At 0;8(13) Jacqueline looks at her mother who is swinging a flounce
of material with her hand. When this spectacle is over, Jacqueline
begins by searching for her mother's hand, places it in front of
the flounce and pushes it to make it resume its activity.... At
0;10(30) Jacqueline grasps my hand, places it against a swinging
doll which she was not able to set going herself, and exerts
pressure on my index finger to make me do the necessary (1952, p. 223).
This behavior has a similarity to verbal recurrence requests not
shared by the other action patterns discussed here: The child uses an
intermediary to cause the repetition, rather than doing so directly by
his own actions. However, as in the two behavior patterns just discussed,
the child uses this behavior to get events to recur, not objects to reappear.
One sensorimotor behavior that does involve the reappearance of an
object is searching for a hidden object. The Stage 3 child will search
for an object only if he was in the process of grasping it when it disap-
peared. The Stage 4 child will search actively for a hidden object, but
will look repeatedly in the first place he found it, even if it was
obviously hidden elsewhere later. The Stage 5 child will search for a
hidden object where he last saw it. It is not until Stage 6 that the
child will be able to find an object that has undergone invisible dis-
placements, as in the example where Piaget placed his hand containing a
coin under three objects in sequence and the child searched under each
object until finding the coin.
The behaviors involved in searching for hidden objects are similar
to recurrence requests in that both are attempts to get an object to
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reappear. In other ways, however, this behavior pattern differs from
recurrence requests. In Piaget's observations, the sensorimotor child
searches for a particular object he has seen hidden, while the Stage I
child's recurrence utterances request either the reappearance of a partic-
ular object, another instance of a category, or an additional quantity of
some mass. Another difference is that in searching behaviors the child
attempts to cause the reappearance of the object himself, while in recurrence
requests the child requests someone else to cause the reappearance.
Thus, there are separate sensorimotor precursors for the various aspects
of the meaning of recurrence requests. The procedures for making interest-
ing spectacles last are precursors to requests for repetitions of events
and for attempts to cause actions at a distance. The use of another's hand
as an intermediary is a precursor to the use of causal intermediaries.
Searching for a hidden object is a precursor to requests for the reappearance
of objects.
Nonexistence. Nonexistence is typically expressed in Stage I speech
by the combination of a negative operator with a nominal or predicte form.
Examples include: No-more noise, no hat, all-gone egg, sun gone and dog away
(Brown, 1973, p. 191). Brown notes that nonexistence constructions, like
recurrence constructions, are used in Stage I as both comments and requests.
In combining nonexistence comments and nonexistence requests, Brown sub-
sumes under one major meaning two meanings that differ in their relationship
to sensorimotor intelligence. These two meanings will be separated here.
Stage I children use nonexistence comments to express nonexistence
within the referential context (i.e., non-presence), not nonexistence in
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an absolute sense. Also, the use of nonexistence constructions does not
require that the referent was just present, although this is often the case.
What is essential is that the presence of the referent was expected, but
did not occur. For example, the child may use a nonexistence construction
if a toy is not found in its customary place, even if he had not seen that
toy for some time.
Brown states that nonexistence comments require the ability to antici-
pate objects and actions from signs and to notice when such anticipations
are not confirmed. The sensorimotor child shows this ability in what Piaget
calls the "recognition of signs and their utilization in prevision" (1952,
pp. 247-252). For example:
From 0;11(15) Jaequeline cries as soon as her mother puts her hat
on. This is not due to fear or anxiety as before but due to the
certainty of the departure.
Therefore, Piaget attributes to the sensorimotor child the abilities Brown
consideres to be prerequisites to nonexistence comments.
Brown does not discuss sensorimotor behaviors that might be precursors
to nonexistence requests. Nor does Piaget describe any sensorimotor schemata
like "procedures for making uninteresting spectacles disappear." There are
no precursors to nonexistence requests in his account of sensorimotor develop-
ment. However, observations of behaviors functionally equivalent to non-
existence requests are quite common; for example, a child pushing away dis-
liked food. Possible sensorimotor precursors that do not appear in Piaget's
account, such as this one for nonexistence requests, will be discussed
further in the final section of this paper.
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Semantic Relations
Agent-Action, Action-Object & Agent-Objecto Since the three semantic
relations of agent-action, action-object and agent-object are interrelated,
they will be discussed together. Brown describes agent, action and object
as follows (The definitions are based on Chafe, 1970). An agent is some-
one or something which is perceived to have its own motivation force and
to cause an action or process. Most agents in Stage I speech are animate,
such as Mommy, Adam,bear, I or you, but a few are inanimate, as in Car go,
An action is a perceived movement. The child uses terms like come, go,
pull, stand up, and write in reference to actions. An object is someone
or something either suffering a change of state or simply receiving the
force of an action. Objects are usually but not always inaminate and are
referred to in Stage I speech by the name of a person or thing or by a
pronoun such as it or that.
Sensorimotor precursors to the linguistic expression of agents, actions
and objects can be found in Piaget's (1954) description of the development
of the concepts of objects and causality.
In Piaget's view of the development of the object concept, the new-born
infant does not conceive of objects and his own activity as independent,
but knows only object-action amalgams: Objects and other people are con-
ceived to exist only when he is acting upon them. As discussed under recur-
rence, the child's behaviors in regard to hidden objects provide evidence
that he comes to conceive of objects as having a separate, permanent existence.
By the end of the sensorimotor period, the child conceives of objects and
actions as independent.
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As for the concept of causality, Piaget states:
At first there is no causality for the child other than his own
actions; the initial universe is not a web of causal sequences
but a mere collection of events arising in extension (1954, p. 220).
Development during the sensorimotor period results in:
The formation of a universe in which the child's action is located
among other causes and obeys the same laws (1954, p. 272).
During Stage 3 of the sensorimotor period the child begins to form
a distinction between actions and the results of actions; i.e., between
causes and effects:
Because with prehension and the handling of cbjects the child's
behavior becomes more systematic and consequently more intentional...
he will better dissociate the purpose or the desire preceding the
result from the action and the result itself. Hitherto cause and
effect were, so to speak, condeased into a single mass centered
around the effect perceived; the feeling of efficacy was merely
one with the result of the act...Hence-forth, on the contrary, as a
a result of the greater complexity of acts and consequently of
their greater purposefulness, cause reveals a tendency to be
internalized and effect to be externalized. (Piaget, 1954, pp. 230-
231).
The Stage 4 child begins to realize that other people besides himself
can function as causal agents. An observation of the child using another's
hand as an intermediary has already been cited when discussing recurrence.
Of this and similar observations Piaget writes:
Such facts seem to us to indicate that during this fourth stage
the child ceases to consider his own action as the sole source
of causality and attributes to someone else's body an aggregate
of particular powers (1954, p. 261).
However, at this stage the child seems to regard external sources as causes
only when his ewn actions intervene in some way; e.g., by pushing the other's
hand.
During Stage 5 the child comes to know that other people and objects
can be causal agents independent of any activity on his part:
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With regard to persons...the child no longer limits himself to
starting their activity by pushing their arms, lips, etc.; he
places himself in front of them in the position in which they
can act upon him or he places in their hands the object upon
which he expects them to act, etc. Behavior of this kind indicates
the existence of a new attitude; from this time on, the child
considers the person of another as an entirely autonomous source
of action (Piaget, 1954, p, 276).
It is also during this stage that the child begins to see himself as
an entity subject to the same laws of causality as other objects. For example;
At 1;3(10) Jacqueline, in her playpen, discovers the possibility of
letting herself fall down in a sitting position; she holds the bar and
lowers herself gently to within a few centimeters of the floor, then
lets go of her support. Before this she has not released the bar until
she was suitably placed, but from now on she lets herself go, foreseeing
the trajectory her movement of falling will follow independently of any
activity on her part (Piaget, 1954, p. 291).
Piaget concludes from this and similar observation:
These few facts of the most commonplace kind converge to show how the
child henceforth considers himself dependent on laws external to himself
or as submitting to the effect of causes independent of himself (p. 291).
Brown states that semantic relations involving agents, actions, and
objects require the ability to distinguish actions from the objects of
actions, and the self from other persons and objects, as well as the ability
to realize that both the self and others are potential causers of actions
and recipients of forces. All of these abilities are attributed to the
child in Piaget's writings. Therefore, there are sensorimotor precursors
to these meanings. However, as will be discussed later, Piaget also attrib-
utes to the child other abilities relevant to causality that are not reflected
in Brown's account of Stage I speech.
Action-Location & Entity Location. Children's utterances expressing
location state the place of occurrence of an action or the place where an
entity is situated. The location is specified either with the name of
the place or with the words here or there. Stage I location utterances
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generally omit the prepositions, such as at, In, and on, that are obliga-
tory in adult language. The recognition of entities and actions has already
been covered. Since the only new element involved in these two semantic
relations is the notion of location, they will be discussed together.
Piaget (1954) discusses in detail the development of the concept of
the spatial field. In his view, the child's first spatial concept is that
of a practical space which, like the child's earliest concepts of objects
and causality, is intertwined with his own actions: "Action creates space
but is not yet situated in it" (1954, p. 102). Also, in the earliest stage,
there is not one unified space but a collection of spaces, each centered
around a sense or activity: a visual space, a tactile space, an auditory
space, etc. Piaget traces the development of the child's concept of space
through an intermediate level of subjective space, which is still closely
tied to the child's action, to the more advanced spatial concept which he
calls objective space. At this stage the child regards space as a container
in which he himself and all objects are located and interrelated. Knowledge
of objective space includes the cognitive prerequisites for expressing
location.
Brown notes that there is no independent evidence to indicate whether
the child intends to express specific relations such as in and on with his
location utterances, or if he is just expressing juxtaposition in space,
as adults do with the preposition at. According to Piaget, a main aspect
in the sensorimotor development of the concept of space is the forming of
spatial relations among objects. He provides examples of sensorimotor
children moving solid objects in and out of hollow objects and balancing
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objects on other objects. He states that this behavior "presupposes or
provokes an interest in the spatial interrelations of objects" (1954, p. 192).
Piaget attributes to the child knowledge of spatial relations which the
child is not credited with intending to express in Brown's application of
the method of rich interpretation.
Possessor-Posssession. Brown groups two types of possession under the
possessor-possession relation, alienable and inalienable. Alienable posses-
sion expresses the notion of property; that is, that the possessor has
prior rights of use or access to the possession. Alienable possession
is expressed in Stage I sppech by utterances such as Daddy chair. Inalienable
possession expresses a permanent part-whole relationship, e.g., Dog tail.
Alienable possessives are much more common in Stage I speech than inalien-
able possessives, although both occur.
Inalienable and alienable possession differ greatly in their relation-
ship to sensorimotor intelligence. Inalienable possessives have a sensori-
motor precursor in behaviors which show that the child can recognize an
object when he sees a part of it. One of Piaget's many relevant observa-
tions follows:
At 0;8(15) Lucienne looks at a celluloid stork which I have just
taken away from her and which I cover with a cloth. She does not
attempt to raise the cloth to take the toy...But when a part of
the stork appears outside the cloth, Lucienne immediately grasps
this bit as though she recognized the whole animal.
The proof that this involves a reconstruction of the whole is
that not every partial presentation is equally propitious. The
head or tail immediately gives rise to a search; Lucienne re-
moves the cloth in order to extricate the auimal. But sight of
the feet alone arouses great interest although the child does
not try to grasp; Lucienne seems not to recognize the stork,
or at least to consider it as being changed. These facts cannot
therefore be interpreted by saying that the child grasps anything
whatever. Moreover, when Lucienne recognizes the stork just by
its head or tail she expects to find a whole.
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Alienable possession, on the other hand, does not seem related to any
sensorimotor action pattern. Edwards (1974) agrees, stating that "in his
discussions of sensory-motor intelligence, Piaget has not dealt with any
notions of possession of objects by persons" (p. 426). The final section
contains further discussion of this problem.
Entity-Attribute. When using utterances expressing the entity-attribute
relation, the child specifies "some attribute of an entity which could not
be known from the class characteristics of the entity alone" (Brown, 1973,
p. 197). Examples of Stage I utterances falling in this class include
Little dog, Hot pepper, and Yellow block. Entity-attribute is one of the
most reliably reported meanings for Stage I children, appearing in almost
every sample Brown reviews. I have been unable to find any possible sensori-
motor precursors to this meaning in Piaget's writings.
Peripheral Meanings
Instrumental. The instrument is something which the agent uses, e.g.,
the key in John opened the door with the key. Piaget traces the development
of the child's use of instruments (1952, pp. 297-305). In his description
of "the behavior pattern of the stick" he clearly attributes a notion of
instruments to the sensorimotor child. For example, by 1;3(12) Jacqueline
has mastered using a stick to obtain objects that she could not reach from
her crib otherwise:
She discovers the possibility of making objects slide on the floor
by means of the stick and so drawing them to her; in order to catch
a doll lying on the ground out of reach, she begins by striking it
with the stick, then, noticing its slight displacement, she pushes
it until she is able to attain it with her right hand (Piaget, 1952,
p. 301).
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Conjunction. The instances of conjunction in Stage I speech name
present objects, The possibility that the recognition of individual
objects is related to sensorimotor schemata has already been discussed.
Assuming this relationship, conjunction has a sensorimotor precursor in
the child's interrelating of individual schemata; i.e., the Stage 4 child's
coordination of schemata.
Indirect Object Dative. The indirect object dative is the recipient
of an object or message, e.g., Bill is the indirect object dative in John
gave the book to Bill. As discussed under the semantic relations involving
agents, actions and objects, by the end of the sensorimotor period the child
is aware that both he himself and others can be causal agents and objects
of actions. However, Piaget does not explicitly attribute to the child
any distinction like that between recipients (expressed grammatically by
indirect objects) and other types of objects of actions (expressed gram-
matically by direct objects). Therefore this meaning does not have a
clear-cut sensorimotor precursor.
Experiencer. The experiencer is the animate being who is said to be
having a mental experience. Edwards (1974) divides experiencer utterances
into three types, depending on whether they describe perceptions (e.g.,
John heard a voice), cognitions (e.g., John knew the answer), or reactions
(e.g., John liked the play). He suggests that Stage I children do not
intend to express experiencer meanings, and that their utterances that
appear to express such meanings are actually either possessive requests
(e.g., Helen want) or locatives expressed by verbs such as see or look.
Piaget considers the act of perceiving to be a sensorimotor action.
He also credits the child with awareness of his own volition. Perhaps
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these are precursors to the child's linguistic expression of his own
mental experience of perception and cognition. Piaget does not describe
the sensorimotor child coming to realize that other people have internal
mental experiences just as he does. Therefore a precursor to utterances
about other people's mental experiences is lacking.
Classificatory. Utterances expressing classification name a member
of a category and the category itself (e.g., Rover dog, Mommy lady).
Apparently Stage I children do not express subset-superset relations (e.g.,
Dog animal, in the sense of dogs are animals).
Piaget's (1962, pp. 224-226) position seems to be that the sensorimotor
child does not have the ability to distinguish between recognizing an
object as a particular entity and recognizing an object as an instance of
a category. That is, Nelson (1974) is in accordance with Piaget's view
when she writes:
Conceptualizing a single object in its various transformations
through time and space may involve the same processes as concep-
tualizing a set of objects (p. 276).
According to Piaget, the sensorimotor child does not distinguish between
recognizing and classifying. Therefore, there is no sensorimotor precursor
for expressing that a referent is a specific entity and that this entity
is a member of a specified category. When using utterances that have
been interpreted as expressing this meaning, perhaps the child is simply
giving two names for a single object without intending to express any
relationship between the names.
Benefactive. The benefactive is the person on behalf of whom an action
is performed. This differs from the object of an action in that the bene-
factive is not necessarily directly involved in the action. For example,
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Mary is the benefactive in Bill bought the milk for Mary. This meaning
has some of the intellectual prerequisites already discussed for other
meanings, such as knowledge of agents and actions. However, I have been
unable to find a sensorimotor precursor to the "for the benefit of" component
that is specific to this meaning.
Comitative. The comitative specifies the person accompanying the
subject of the verb. This person must also be taking part in the action
named by the verb. Usually the word with precedes the comitative, as in
John left with Pete. Some of the components of this meaning, such as
other people being agents, are identical to those already discussed.
However, I have been unable to find a sensorimotor precursor for the "with"
component that is specific to this meaning.
Other Possible Meanings
An important question is whether there are other possible meanings
besides those on Brown's list. Brown provides a partial list of things
Stage I children do not talk about, including past and future events,
conditional and hypothetical statements, causality, varieties of spatial
relations, number, and some aspects of time. The intellectual prerequisites
for some of these possible meanings are acquired during the sensorimotor
period. That is, there are sensorimotor schemata that have the potential
of being represented in Stage I speech but are not reflected in any of the
meanings on Brown's list. It has already been mentioned that Piaget attri-
butes to the sensorimotor child knowledge of some spatial relations, such
as in and on. However, in Brown's application of the method of rich
interpretation the Stage I child is not credited with intending to express
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these relations. Two other possible meanings which would be assigned
clear-cut sensorimotor precursors if they were expressed in Stage I speech
are discussed below.
Action-Result. There is no meaning on Brown's list that expresses
an action and its result. This relationship could be easily expressed in
two-word speech by utterances such as Push fall, Throw break, etc. However,
it does not seem to appear.
Piaget traces in detail the development of the distinction between
action and results (or, in his terms, means and ends). This distinction
first appears in Stage 4, when the child begins to coordinate his schemata
in various ways. Piaget's criterion for the existence of this distinction
is that the child attempts to attain a goal via one means, fails, and then
tries an alternative means for obtaining the same goal, as in the following
observation:
At 0;8(20) Jacqueline tries to grasp a cigarette case which I
present to her. I then slide it between the crossed strings
which attach her dolls to the hood. She tries to reach it
directly. Not succeeding, she immediately looks for the strings
which are not in her hands and of which she only saw the part
in which the cigarette case is entangled. She looks in front of
her, grasps the strings, pulls and shakes them, etc. The ciga-
rette case then falls and she grasps it (1952, p. 215).
Event-Time. Brown's list does not include any expression of temporal
relations. Apparently the Stage I child does not use words like before,
after, later, etc. However, as discussed under recurrence, the sensori-
motor child develops elementary concepts of before and after.
Summary. Table 3 summarizes the results of the evaluation of Brown's
proposal. The table lists meanings and some intellectual prerequisites
Insert Table 3 about here
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on the left and sensorimotor precursors on the right. Starting with the
major meanings, those which have clear-cut sensorimotor precursors are:
recurrence comments, nonexistence comments, agent-action, agent-object,
action-object, inalienable possession, action-location and entity-location.
These are marked by + in Table 3. Partial or less clear-cut precursors
were found for nomination and recurrence requests, marked by ? in the table.
No precursors were found for nonexistence requests, alienable possession
and entity-attribute, marked by -. Among the peripheral meanings, precursors
were found for instrumentals, conjunctions and some types of experiencers,
but not for the other four.
At least two other possible meanings, action-result and event-time,
have sensorimotor precursors, but fail to appear on Brown's list. Some
aspects of sensorimotor intelligence might be reflected in language later
than others if their expression requires linguistically more complex forms.
However, I know of no measure of complexity that would differentiate these
last two meanings from the others. Nor can they be differentiated in terms
of their usefulness to the child.
Overall, Brown's list of Stage I communicative intentions does not
directly reflect sensorimotor intelligence: Some of the meanings have
sensorimotor precursors while others do not; some possible meanings have
sensorimotor precursors but do not appear on his list.
What conclusion should be drawn from the lack of a complete match
between Brown's communicative intentions and Piaget's account of sensori-
motor intelligence? One possibility is that communicative intentions arise
in vacuo. This possibility leads to one of two alternatives: either the
communicative intentions expressed in early language are completely
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independent of non-linguistic cognitive development or we must resurrect
Watson's notion that speech precedes thought'. Both of these seem unlikely,
especially in light of recent work on prelinguistic and one-word commu-
nication (Carter, 1975; Bloom, 1975; Greenfield, Smith, & Laufer, in press).
Another possibility is to accept that there is a prelinguistic cogni-
tive basis to early communicative intentions and conclude that one or more
of the elements that went into the preceding analysis were not completely
correct. The analysis was based upon three elements: the set of Stage I
communicative intentions given by Brown, the set of sensorimotor cognitive
abilities described by Piaget, and the criterion of general similarity used
to determine whether members of these two sets are related. The final
section of this paper contains a discussion of problems with each of these
elements and some suggestions of approaches to solving these problems.
III. Unsolved Problems
The most obvious problem is the criterion of general similarity used
to determine whether a communicative intention stems from sensorimotor
abilities. However, it is important to note that no one has offered a
better criterion. The criterion of general similarity is somewhat un-
reliable: Someone else attempting the same type of analysis as presented
in the previous section would probably not arrive at exactly the same
precursors for every meaning. However, it seems unlikely that there would
be changes in the final conclusion that some of the communicative inten-
tions have sensorimotor precursors in Piaget's descriptions, others do not,
while some are unclear cases.
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A more crucial problem is that the criterion of general similarity
may be misleading: A prelinguistic cognitive ability may seem similar to
a communicative intention without actually being part of its prelinguistic
cognitive basis. With the current state of knowledge, there is little
information available to insure against this possibility. To do so, longi-
tudinal studies seem necessary. In order to determine whether a communica-
tive intention is actually based on a sensorimotor ability, it would be
helpful to know such things as the following:
(1) Do all children exhibit evidence of the sensorimotor ability before
the communicative intention appears?
(2) Is there a correlation between the age of appearence of the sen-
sorimotor ability and the age of appearence of the communicative intention?
(3) Are there similarities in the situations in which the sensorimotor
ability is manifested and in which the communicative intention is produced?
In particular it would be of interest to know whether in situations where
the child's verbal utterance does not get him what he wants, the child then
uses the sensorimotor action pattern. Information about this last question
could easily be determined by failing at times to respond appropr:iately to
utterances expressing a certain communicative intention.
A second problem concerns the set of prelinguistic cognitive abilities.
For the preceding analysis, Piaget's descriptions were assumed to be both
correct and complete. However, when discussing nonexistence requests it
was noted that there exists a possible prelinguistic precursor that does
not appear in the set of sensorimotor action patterns Piaget describes.
Suppose we assume that Piaget's descriptions of the sensorimotor child are
essentially correct but not complete. Can precursors for the communicative
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intentions lacking them in Table 3 be found in other observations?
One meaning lacking a precursor is alienable possession. Perhaps a
precursor to this meaning can be found in the situation where one child
plays with another child's toy. Any indication that the child realizes
someone else has a prior right to the toy would be evidence of a primitive
notion of possession. The child bringing someone something belonging to
them would also be behavioral evidence of a notion of possession.
The other major meaning lacking a precursor in Piaget's descriptions
is entity-attribute. The attributes children talk about are perceptual,
things like big, red, etc. It therefore would be difficult to find evidence
in sensorimotor behaviors of knowledge of these attributes. However, per-
haps 18 month old children can be shown to group objects (or, more likely,
pairs of objects) on the basis of attributes such as those Stage I children
name.
Therefore, all of Brown s major meanings have possible precursors in
6prelinguistic intelligence. Observations of sensorimotor children in which
the observer looks specifically for precursors to particular meanings might
resolve whether these possible precursors are the actual basis of the
communicative intentions.
The remaining problem lies in determining what constitutes a Stage I
communicative intention. That is, what is the criterion for individuating
Stage I communicative intentions? Examples of this problem can be found
by comparing the two lists of communicative intentions shown in Table 1.
For example, Schlesinger places possessives (e.g., my book) under the modi-
fier + head relation, while Slobin separates possessives and modifiers into
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two separate communicative intentions. Other examples can be found in the
analysis presented in Section II. For that analysis it was necessary to
subdivide three of Brown's major meanings: recurrence into recurrence
comments and recurrence requests, nonexistence into nonexistence comments
and non-existence requests, and possessives into alienable possessives
and inalienable possessives. The important question is: Which of these
alternative divisions of communicative intentions best characterizes Stage
I children's knowledge? Since it determines the set of meanings that
precursors are needed for, the procedure for individuating meanings can
determine whether or not precursors will be found. That is, the criterion
used can largely determine the outcome of an analysis such as that pre-
sented in Section II.
Individuating communicative intentions is also a crucial problem for
another important proposal about early language; the proposal of universality.
This proposal states that the same set of communicative intentions are
expressed by all Stage I children, no matter what language they are learn-
ing (Brown, 1973). Clearly, one could formulate a set consisting of a few
very general meanings which would all be found in any sample of child
speech. Alternatively, one could formulate a set consisting of many very
specific meanings, few of which would appear in any given sample of child
language. Therefore, without a justified criterion for individuating
meanings, the proposal of universality is vacuous.
Looking at Brown's possessor-possession meaning will clarify this
problem. For the preceding analysis, this was divided into two meanings,
alienable and inalienable possession. The corpora of four children's
utterances provided by Bloom et al. (1975) contains 73 Stage I possession
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utterances. Seventy of these expressed alienable possession and only
three expressed inalienable possession. Therefore, depending on whether
or not these meanings are combined, we either have one meaning that appears
frequently, or two meanings, one of which is frequent and the other rare.
If considered to be a separate meaning, inalienable possession could not
be counted as universal.
The general problem can be described as follows. There are two mean-
ings, X and Y, that can be distinguished by adults. When characterizing
the child's knowledge of language, we wish to determine whether X and Y
should be combined into one communicative intention or separated into two.
The question is: What type of criteria might be used for individuating
children's communicative intentions? Linguists who distinguish the com-
municative intentions in adult language, such as Chafe (1970), use adult
intuitions and look for various types of syntactic distinctions. Clearly,
criteria of this sort cannot be used at the early stages of language
acquisition.
There are, however, three independent kinds of evidence that can be
used to determine whether or not X and Y should be combined. The first is
whether or not X and Y first appear in children's speech at about the same
time. If, for example, X generally appears after Y, we have evidence that
X and Y do not form one communicative intention. The second kind of evi-
dence is whether X and Y stem from the same or different aspects of sensori-
motor intelligence. If they have different sensorimotor precursors, we
again have evidence that X and Y do not form one communicative intbetion
for the child. The third kind of evidence requires looking at a slightly
later stage of language acquisition. If soon after Stage I the child
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acquires a more advanced form of expressing X, but does not use this
form to express Y, we have evidence that he distinguishes X and Y. This
is based on Slobin's (1973) general principle that new forms express old
functions (functions = communicative intentions). The use of a new form
to express an old function may enable us to determine how inclusive that
function was.
The information necessary to apply these criteria to all the possible
cases is not available, but some examples of their application can be
given. Looking at the possessive and locative cases, and again using the
corpora provided by Bloom et al. (1975), we find that alienable possession
appears before inalienable possession, while entity-location and action-
location utterances appear at about the same time. On the second bit of
evidence, the two types of possession do not have similar sensorimotor
precursors, while the two types of locatives overlap in their sensori-
motor precursors (see Table 3). Therefore it seems that alienable and
inalienable possession should be divided into two communicative intentions,
while entity-location and action-location should be combined into one.
I do not have the information necessary to apply the third criterion
to these examples. That is, for example, I do not know if when the child
starts using the possessive inflection, he applies it to both alienable and
inalienable possessives at about the same time. However, the information
needed to apply this criterion is available for another example. As already
noted, Schiesinger groups attribute-entity and possessor-possession utter-
ances under a single communicative intention, which he calls modifier +
head. Both Brown and Slobin separate these into two separate communicative
intentions. Soon after Stage I the child begins to reliably use the
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possessive inflection -- to say Mmmy's lunch instead of Mommy lunch.
Since the child does not use this inflection with attributes, we have
evidence that he distinguishes possessives from attributes, we have
soon after Stage I.
Three logically independent criteria for determining whether or not
two possible communicative intentions should be combined have been suggested.
These criteria involve the time of appearence of the candidate communicative
intentions, the overlap in their sensorimotor precursors and the develop-
ment of the forms used to express the intentions after Stage I. If these
three converge -- that is, if they each lead to the same way of individuat-
ing communicative intentions -- they would seem to provide reasonable
criteria. Whether or not they will converge is yet to be determined.
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Footnotes
I am indebted to Eve Clark, Ellen Markman, Dan Osherson, Neil Stillings,
Ed Smith and Janet Walker for their helpful comments on earlier versions of
this paper.
1The interested reader is referred to the work of Greenfield, Smith &
Laufer (in press) and Bloom (1973) on the communicative intentions expressed
in one-word speech, and to Carter (1975) for work on prelinguistic communica-
tion.
Brown also discusses a demonstrative-entity relation. However, since
in his final analysis it is subsumed under nomination, it is excluded here.
3
Stages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to Piaget's stages of sensorimotor
development. Stage I (roman numeral) refers to Brown's first stage of
language acquisition.
Whether the child distinguishes between recognizing a particular object
(e.g., when he says See Rover in reference to a dog he knows) and recognizing
an object as a member of a category (e.g., when he says See doggie in
reference to a dog he has never seen before) will be discussed under the
classificatory meaning.
The notation x;y (z) designates x years, y months and z days of age.
In order to avoid a great many more details, the peripheral meanings
will not be discussed further.
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Table 1: Sample Lists of Children's Communicative Intentions
Slobin's Expressive Functions
Locate, Name:
Demand, Desire:
Negate
Nonexistence:
Rejection:
Denial:
Describe Event
Agent-Action:
Action-Object:
Agent-Object:
Locative:
Instrumental:
Dative:
Indicate Possession:
Modify, Qualify:
Question
Wh-questions:
Yes-no Questions:
there book, that car
more milk, give candy
no wet (meaning "dry")
no wash (meaning "don't wash me")
no girl (denying preceding assertation)
Bambi go
hit ball
Momma bread
Baby highchair
cut knife
throw Daddy (meaning "throw it to Daddy")
My shoe, mamma dress
pretty dress, big boat
where ball
(marked by rising intonation on any utterance)
Schlesinger's Underlying Intentions
A.- Operations
Negation + X: no wash, no wz
X + Dative throw Daddy (r
Introducer + X: see boy, it b
X + Locative: sat wall, bab3
B. Relations
Agent + Action: Bambi go, air]
Action + Object: pick glove, wE
Agent + Object: Eve lunch, Mor
ater
neaning "throw it to Daddy")
all
y highchair
plane by
ant more
nmy sandwich
pretty boat, my bookModifier + Head:
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Table 2: Brown's Communicative Intentions of Stage I Speech
I. Major Meanings
A. Operations of Reference
Nomination:
Recurrence:
Nonexistence:
B. Semantic Relations
Agent - Action:
Agent - Object:
Action - Object:
Entity - Location:
Action - Location:
Possessor - Possession:
Attribute - Entity:
that book, there clown
more milk, another swing
all-gone juice, no-more dog
Adam put, Eve read
Mommy sock, Mommy lunch
put book, hit ball
sweater chair, book table
walk street, go store
Adam checker, Mommy lunch
big train, red book
II. Peripheral Meanings
Instrumental:
Benefactive:
Indirect Object Dative:
Experiencer:
Comitative:
Classificatory:
Conjunction:
sweep broom
for Daddy
give me book
Adam see
Go mommy (meaning "go with Mommy")
Mommy lady
Kimmy Phil (names present objects)
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Table 3: Stage I Communicative Intentions g Their Sensorimotor Precursors
Major Meanings Precursors
? Nomination
recognition of objects
and events
+ Recurrence Comments
recognition
memory
notion of immediate past
? Recurrence Requests
recurrence of events
reappearence of objects
+ Nonexistence Comments
expectation
schemata of recognition & classifica-
tion (doesn't account for specific
concepts)
see nomination
deferred imitation and following a
series of invisible displacements
deferred reactions
secondary circular reactions, prodedures
for making interesting spectacles last,
using another's hand as an intermediary
searching for a hidden object
recognition of signs and their utiliaza-
tion in prevision
- Nonexistence Requests
Agent - Action
+Agent - Object
Action - Object
+ Inalienable Possession
part-whole concept
-Alienable Possession
property
-Attribute - Entity
Action - Location
+Entity - Location
development of concepts of objects
and causality
searching for the whole object when only
a part is visible
development of concept of the spatial
field
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Table 3 continued
Peripheral Meanings
+ Instrumental
- Benefactive
- Indirect Object Dative
? Experiencer
- Comitative
- Classificatory
+ Conjunction
Other Possible Meanings
Action - Result (e.g., push fall)
Event - Time (e.g., eat before)
Precursors
behavior of the stick
Not distinguished from other objects
of actions
Awareness of own volition, but no
mention of children realizing that
others have mental experiences
coordination of schemata
distinction between means and ends
deferred reactions
Key
+ clear-cut sensorimotor precursor
- no sensorimotor precursor
? unclear ease
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